In the preceding lecture I tried to place before the reader a frame of reference of discussing at some length the nature of the physician-patient relationship. This relationship is in essence a contract between two equal parties, but the medical profession tends to look at it as one in which the physician plays the dominant role and the patient a dependent one. I attempted to explore the effect of the conflict between the two points of view in looking at two broad questions, the matter of civil liability which grows out of the one-to-one relationship, and proposals for the provision of medical care for chronic illness which grows out of the broader relationship of public to profession. I pointed out how disparities between the expectation of the public and the norms of the profession have resulted in reaction patterns on the part of the public. We saw, as in the case of "Good Samaritan" legislation, that the reaction of the public could inure to the benefit of the profession, and in the case of application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that the reaction can be distinctly disadvantageous. In a similar fashion, we could also look at the current dialogue between public and profession on payment for medical care which is based in some measure on the respective attitudes each holds concerning the nature of the relationship.
I have now selected the two remaining topics-the use of human beings as experimental subjects and the care of the terminally ill-for several reasons. These topics were selected not only because of current interest but also because there are as yet relatively unformulated positions on the proper management of the two problems. An attempt then may be made at formulating a position based on the frame of reference with which we began.
I SHINDELL
It is entirely possible in doing so to look at the variance between the societal norm and the professional ethic in a somewhat different fashion than the previous paper. They were then, two distinct and separate standards. It may be more proper, however, to look at the one as supplementing and augmenting the other. In this context then, the professional ethic would serve to enlarge upon the societal norm. The rights possessed by the patient under his doctor-patient contract would thus be expanded by the position of trust in which the physician is placed. In the topics of this paper this position would seem to be necessary.
HUMAN BEINGS AS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS
Many will undoubtedly recall the problem that occurred in New York last year on the question of injection of cultured neoplastic cells into patients at a chronic hospital. This brought into focus the problems that occur in employing people in investigational projects when there is as yet no concensus as to the proper conduct of experimental work.
Prior to World War II there was so little human experimentation that no one realized a problem existed. There were the classical stories of Walter Reed and his volunteers, of Arrowsmith and the ethical problem of a control series, but research as we now know it was minimal. The little being done in the 1940's was essentially limited to evaluations of newly introduced antibiotics that were so dramatic in their effect, and so much more efficacious than standard medication, that there was no problem either about enlisting willing volunteers or in maintaining controls. We had such limited supplies in the early days that only a portion of our patients could be chosen; we chose our patients by some chance process, and by and large our only problem consisted of attempts by members of the patient's families to pressure staff members to get a specific patient included in the "experimental" series.
When a study was projected that required healthy volunteers, we would enlist medical students who volunteered either for the small amount of money we might be able to offer or because it might be good business to endear oneself to a faculty member, or we would go to a prison and enlist volunteers whose motives were varied. Some hoped for an early release, and used volunteering as an item in their favor before parole boards. Some, no doubt, were trying to deal with their guilt feelings concerning their prior antisocial behavior. With these two sources of supply, however, there was usually sufficient "material" for the limited studies that went on.
The atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II included experimentation on persons condemned to death. We reacted to this for several reasons. One, of course, was the fact that we could not justify in our own minds the basis for the imprisonment and the condemnation in the first place. Secondly, we felt that the experiments were conducted in a fashion that we would not have tolerated in our laboratory animals. Thirdly, we felt that little if any of the work performed was of such moment as to be of value to the scientific world. Hence, no possible justification could be found for the actions of the members of the German medical profession who conducted the experiments in question.
The Nuremberg Trials, conducted by the Allies after the conclusion of hostilities, concerned themselves with the persons who participated in this work as well as with the persons who had committed the other "crimes against humanity." In order to provide a basis for judging the participants, a code of ethics was formulated which purported to be and undoubtedly was the norm of acceptable behavior at that time. I think it is important to review the principal points of the code at this point. The code states:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments in which the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state at which continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any state, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.'
Here we are less than a score of years later and we have some serious questions as to the applicability of some of the provisions of the Nuremberg code. Particularly troublesome are the provisions concerning consent when we consider "double-blind" designs. In the recent regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug administration concerning the testing of new drugs, this concern has been taken into account, and consent is required "except where this is not feasible or, in the investigator's professional judgment, it is contrary to the best interests of the subjects."'
The matter of consent becomes most material because (a) the attitude of the courts to consent in purely therapeutic situations has undergone change, (b) the amount of research involving human subjects has increased tremendously, and (c) we have seen a shift in the willingness of patients to participate in various types of investigations. This shift has largely been due to the experience with Thalidomide, when it forcefully became apparent that drugs can be dangerous even when they appear to be innocuous.
As might also be expected, question has been raised as to the applicability of the Nuremberg code since experimentation is not a single entity, but a spectrum. When we talk about an experiment involving a determination of the time required for loss of life from freezing (as an example of the kind of investigation that was done in the Nazi concentration camps), this is a far cry from testing a new therapeutic agent for a disorder with which a particular subject is currently affected, and a set of rules can only be meaningful if we are clear as to the situation to which they apply. It should be apparent that in order to deal with the problem intelligently, we must distinguish among the various situations with which we might be faced.
One might start with an overall definition of experimentation. McCance defines it as "anything done to a patient which is not generally accepted as being for his direct therapeutic benefit or as contributing to the diagnosis of his disease."' Hence, anything that might be generally accepted as good for the patient should not properly be thought of as experimentation. Interestingly enough, however, the widely quoted dictum that "a doctor experiments at his peril" is derived from a case decided in 1767' which really dealt with a departure from accepted means of therapy, and had nothing to do with the subject to which we are addressing ourselves today.
INVESTIGATIONS CLASSIFIED
In an attempt to classify investigations so that one might place our system of rules in appropriate context, Schreiner' has divided investigations into five groups depending on the degree of benefit to the patient. His classification is as follows:
1. An investigation to determine the relative efficacy of an agent which may improve the immediate clinical condition of the patient. This poses little problem either for the patient or the physician from the ethical or legal point of view. There may be problems of how one obtains consent for a double-blind design, and it is this type of case in which the F.D.A. rules are meant to apply. It is, of course, this type of clinical trial that Bradford Hill was referring to when he stated:
Where the value of a treatment, new or old, is doubtful, there may be a higher moral obligation to test it critically than to continue to prescribe it year-in-year-out with the support merely of custom or wishful thinking. 6 Schreiner's second category is:
2. An investigation related to the condition that patient is suspected of having and that may result in direct good to patient at some future time. The example he used is cardiac catheterization in early stages of rheumatic fever in order to improve knowledge of hemodynamics at this stage of disease.
Specific consent of patient with full knowledge of motives for study would appear to be required in this situation, for otherwise such a procedure would clearly constitute an assault on the patient.
3. Investigations related to conditions that the patient may acquire with a high degree of probability. Example: Base-line studies in young women who are expected to become pregnant or nutrition studies on young men expected to develop atherosclerosis or coronary disease. These certainly require consent and procedures or techniques constituting any danger to the experimental subject would not likely be condoned.
4. Investigations involving study of conditions that the subject is not likely to acquire. Justification for this type of study rests not on personal benefit but on some other principle, such as a contribution to the common good. As an example, one might conceive of the studies on the transmission of infectious hepatitis among prison volunteers. In this type of study we begin to approximate the type of situation in which rules such as the Nuremberg code are appropriate. Schreiner concludes with:
5. Studies which bear no relationship to disease processes or conditions that could conceivably affect subject. These, I would suggest are the types of studies that were condemned in the Nuremberg trials and for which the rules were formulated.
It would appear reasonable to suggest that as one moves in the descending order of categories of study-descending in terms of possible benefit to the patient-the obligation to the patient to minimize risk and to preserve the independence of his decision increases. Recognition of these precepts has been embodied in the recent "Declaration of Helsinki" promulgated by the World Medical Association.' In this code of ethics a distinction is made between "clinical research combined with professional care" and "nontherapeutic clinical research," with the principal provision of the Nuremberg code embodied in the latter.
I think we can agree that the position of a physician demands that, at best, he can only offer the individual the opportunity to become an experimental subject, and the obligation to inform a patient in obtaining 3"9 consent must be at least as great as one applies in therapeutic situations and becomes increasingly greater as one descends the Schreiner scale. To do otherwise is not only to breach the position of trust imposed by the profession, but also to breach the contractual relationship imposed by society's norms.
The principal problem inherent in enlisting the cooperation of human subjects in investigation is the temptation to exploit the position held by the physician. I do not suggest this is done consciously.
usually given the most cursory answers or may be incapable of understanding the specific reason even if given. What I suggest is that the patient may think that what is being done is for his direct therapeutic benefit when in fact it might not be.
I think it is valid to suggest that patients think that everything done to them is for their direct benefit, and for an investigator to exploit this belief requires at least introspection on his part. It is not enough to suggest that the patient should expect to become a participant in investigations simply because he comes to a university hospital. Even if one might expect an increased likelihood of research being conducted in the university setting, at the very least the patient should be appraised of the possibility (or probability) when entering a teaching service of research ward. We, at the University of Pittsburgh have devised a special consent form which does just this. We have included language such as the following: "I realize that I may have special studies performed that are ordinarily not a part of normal diagnosis, and may receive drugs or other treatments not yet in widespread use, and I freely consent to the use of these tests and treatments performed in the interest of medical science. However, I understand that no test or treatment will be administered which may involve any unusual risk unless the nature and probability of the risk and the reason for the procedure are explained to me and my separate written consent obtained." to the special experimenter-subject relationship should an issue ever arise. Just as the only real defense to a claim of negligence in practice is to demonstrate that careful, competent medicine has been applied in good faith and in the patient's interest, we believe that ability to show conformance to a high standard of care and competence in investigative work will be protection from any claim that may arise from an experimental situation, provided we can show that we were cognizant of and exercised concern for the rights of the patient as a human being.
I suggest that the appropriate standard for investigative work rests in the nature of the relationship which exists between the parties. Since, in the conduct of research, a benefit is to be derived above and beyond the direct care for the patient, it would seem that the rights of the patient should be greater than they would be under the normal relationship. It would appear that the position of trust granted the physician clearly enlarges, rather than abridges the basic rights the patient would normally possess in the usual relationship.
THE CARE OF THE TERMINALLY ILL
When we come to consider the rights of patients when the physician is placed in a position of trust, we come inevitably to what is probably the most difficult problem facing the physician-the question of terminal illness and the artificial prolongation of life. That this should be a difficult question is readily understandable, for the greater the trust afforded any person, the greater the burden to be borne by him. When I suggested earlier that the appropriate courses of action are largely unformulated, it is probably because formulation is a difficult task, and difficult tasks are often avoided if possible.
There is, of course, a single rule which presumably applies to all circumstances, and that is the physician is bound to prolong life in all individuals as long as he can by whatever means he has at hand. Recognizing that at times, because of intractable pain, the end of life occasionally becomes unbearable, the major religions in contemporary American society suggest that a physician may not always be bound to employ any and all means at his disposal. Rather he may restrict his ministrations to the employment of "ordinary" but not "extraordinary" means. As a practical matter, however, this leaves the problem where it began, because it is now necessary to define the term "extraordinary."
It also becomes necessary to define the circumstances under which the withholding of extraordinary means may be "justified." And just as the rule of the Nuremberg trial is designed to apply to one portion of a problem which exists in a spectrum, it is possible that the problems we have in considering appropriate care for the terminally ill result from the fact that here we are dealing with a spectrum also. In my view, we can divide the spectrum somewhat arbitrarily into five parts, and approach each in turn. Unlike the division we employed for experimentation, however, we are not really faced with a gradation of a single attribute, but with somewhat dissimilar conditions containing common features.
For convenience then, rather than on any logical basis, let us arbitrarily divide our problem into the following specific situations:
a) The maintenance of "normal" life by "unusual" means (e.g., use of pacemaker, dialysis, respirator, etc.) b) The maintenance of "abnormal" life- Little is left to be said about these categories. The only apparent problem in the first category is cost and availability. I can see no essential difference between a tablet of digitalis and a peritoneal dialysis except in cost, in difficulty, and in ready availability. Should more patients require the procedure than could be provided for, some judgment must be exercised. Normally either chance is permitted to operate (first come, first served or random choice if several at the same time) or some assessment of relative benefit is made. These latter decisions are difficult and no one wishes to make them. Essentially one adopts the norm of society and attempts to fit the decision into the code of generally acceptable behavior. Hence, if the mode of choice is "fair" and "equitable," i.e., conforming to the standard of equality among men or reasonably understandable bases for classification, the decision is considered acceptable. This is the type of decision made in military or disaster situations, and in dealing with waiting lists for admission to oversubscribed facilities. In making our selection, however, something other than the welfare of each individual patient comes into play, since it is apparent that one cannot act to the benefit of all individuals involved. We attempt to act, nonetheless, for the benefit of the greaetest number of patients, or for society as a whole.
It seems somewhat paradoxical to note that when the position of trust must be assumed by the physician he employs no independent standard. The element of trust consists of the right and duty to apply a generally accepted standard. This appears to be the essence of the physician's burden in this circumstance. He is entrusted with the task of being unswayed by any consideration other than what is most equitable. At times he is unwilling to carry this burden alone and a committee, as in the Seattle dialysis center, is created to make this weighty decision.
Once having made a selection, we return attention to the patient himself, but during the process of selection our so-called medical ethics are set aside in favor of the broader ethical norm of society. It should be stated frankly that while we make attempts to be impartial, the complete elimination of bias is more strived for than achieved.
In the remainder of the categories, we frankly recognize that another principle comes into play. Again we cannot suggest that the individual patient is our sole obligation. I'd like to suggest that in effect we assume responsibility for therapy for the family as either in conflict with or as overriding our concern for the patient who presents himself in these other categories.
Let us take them in order. There is a tendency to use only the most cursory efforts at resuscitation (or none at all) at the birth of an anencephalic infant. Whether we like it or not, we must admit that we may baptize the infant and hope it does not survive. We tend to feel it is kinder to the mother who may subsequently produce a healthy child to have to tell her she had a still-birth than to have to burden her with a malformed infant who can never realize the hopes and dreams parents have for their children.
The picture changes, of course, if the child breathes spontaneously. Our morality will not permit us (and should not permit us) to destroy the child. This is violative of the expectation of the public of the function of the physician, an image which we share. But a discussion of this issue properly belongs later since the spontaneous life appearing in the malformed child removes it from the category now being considered.
More important to consider in this category than the case of the malformed infant, however, is the use of supportive measures in the individual with severe brain damnage arising from either trauma or resuscitative efforts applied too late, or from sequellae of intoxicating substances. It is more important for two principal reasons: because of the growing frequency of occurrence, and because of the status of the patient within the family. We are no longer dealing with a person who is in contact with the world as in the first category of cases or with a person never having been in contact with the world as was the case with our last example. We now must consider the person who has lost contact with the world and our query revolves around our obligation to maintain vegetative function. It appears that with our increased ability to maintain vital processes, we have come to find it difficult to define life.
The problem faced by the physician is how vigorous he is to be in the application of supportive therapy. In conflict is his obligation as a physician to maintain life and his humanity as he sees the toll taken by such a patient on the family.
The major religions in this country are in substantial agreement that "extraordinary" measures need not be employed to maintain vitality in this type of patient. The definition of "extraordinary," however, is left again to the doctor. I would suggest, however, that it really is no longer a medical decision in terms of patient need, but an assessment of how much needs to be done to deal with the hope of recovery possessed by the family, and their feelings of guilt over past relationships. Actual treatment is terminated at that nebulous point where the family reinforces the physician's feelings that "we have done all we can."
The point at which this decision is reached is often a function of the age of the patient, for not too dissimilar from the case I presented is that of the aged patient who has had a series of cerebral vascular accidents or is in advanced renal failure and lapses in and out of coma. There is no good standard on which a decision is made, except possibly to suggest that the physician maintains therapy as long as he reasonably can. In this category of patient, more so than in the previous, reliance on "professional judgment" is required.
We cannot dispose of this type of patient, however, without adding one additional component-self-doubt on the part of the physician. The classification of the patient into this category is based on some estimate of prognosis, i.e., the patient will not improve. Yet all of us have seen how wrong we can be on occasion. All of us have seen comatose patients we were certain were hopeless return to consciousness. The frequency is slight, but we do not normally practice medicine on the basis of probabilities. Because of our lack of certainty we tend to maintain therapy because we refuse to accept the onus of not doing so with the possibility of error. It is because of the ambivalence involved in this problem that neither we as a profession, nor our religious brethren, nor the public as a whole have been able to arrive at any clearcut criteria for decision. It might be said that it is in this type of situation that the physician carries his burden of trust most heavily, for there is no way for him to avoid or to share it.
In view of what we have just said about the maintenance of "abnormal" life by "usual" means, the next category, i.e., employment of "unusual" means should require no discussion. But it does. The problem as I stated it lies in the definition of what is "unusual" or "extraordinary." If we look on this problem simply as a matter of cost and availability, as we did when our patient was in contact with the world, we can postulate a circumstance in which the modalities are available, albeit costly. Does the fact that a person has lost contact with the world alter the circumstance? When do we stop?
WHEN DOES DEATH OCCUR?
Two problems have recently arisen in this connection. The first is a matter of professional liability. Could a patient's family maintain an action for malpractice if a physician failed to use any means available to maintain life? There is recent suggestion that the answer might be yes. The real answer lies, however, in the fact that, as was mentioned, one of the objectives in treating a patient in extremis is to treat the family. I would suggest that if adequate rapport with the family had been maintained, an issue on the propriety of therapy should not have arisen, and I would remind you that when such a question does arise, it is society's norms which are applied.
The other problem is contained in a recent British case8 and also raised a difficult legal question. The facts are relatively clearcut and may be briefly stated. A young man received severe head injuries in a fight and was brought to a hospital. Fourteen hours after admission spontaneous respirations ceased and he was placed in a respirator, permission having been obtained for removal of a kidney intended for transplant. Twentyfour hours later, the transplantation operation was performed, and the patient removed from the respirator at which time respiration and circulation ceased. An inquest was held to determine when death had occurred and whether the physicians were guilty of any offense in turning off the respirator. At the inquest it was said that the patient was medically dead, i.e., incapable of independent life, as of the time his respirations initially ceased and hence the kidney was removed from one who was already dead. The medico-legal reporter of the British Medical Journal expressed serious doubt about this case, as I think it is proper to do. If vital processes (except for cerebration) could be maintained by respirator, was not the physician bound to keep the respirator going once he had applied it? Are we faced with the necessity of defining life, not in terms of independent existence, since pace-makers and respirators have changed this, but in some other terms? If we use the test of contact with the world, are we forced to reevaluate our approach to the catatonic schizophrenic?
Are we possibly to be faced with the same problem that was present on the West Coast with dialysis already mentioned, in which a committee was appointed to decide who should receive this mode of therapy? Will we have to empanel committees to decide when to discontinue artificially maintained respiration and circulation?
This brings us to the last two categories: the issue of euthanasia, and the category designated by Fletcher9 as anti-dysthanasia. The distinction between the two is one of acts of omission versus acts of commission, anti-dysthanasia being a matter of failing to take positive action to maintain life, while euthanasia, as generally understood means the affirmative decision and act to end a life which has "permanently ceased to be agreeable or useful."8 Sperry, in reviewing the subject,'0 points out that in many primitive societies and in pre-christian Greece various forms of infanticide were practiced as a kind of "social surgery." Orthodox Judaic teaching and classical Christian thought have been consistent in their opposition to the taking of human life under such circumstances. St. Thomas Aquinas condemned any thought of euthanasia as a) Unnatural, i.e., contrary to the charity man bears himself, b) An offense against the community, and c) A usurpation of God's power to kill or to make alive. Leo Alexander' suggests that euthanasia can only exist when the society that condones it has departed from the principle of equality among men. For, in his view, euthanasia requires a value judgment concerning certain individuals, and is based on the premise that there is a life not "worthy" to be lived.
Hence, while general agreement can be found concerning "the legality of expediting death of an incurable patient in acute agony by withholding from him such medicaments as sustain his continued life by unnatural means," there is considerable disagreement on the issue of euthanasia.
There was once a bill actually introduced in the New York Legislature, which would permit a patient to apply for the procedure, require a certification by a physician, and empanel a committee to consider the petition of the patient. There was considerable opposition to the bill on the basis that such a procedure (like divorce or mental hospital commitment) might become essentially routine. There was also fear that there might be expansion of criteria, and the Nazi experience in which 275,000 persons were put to death with conditions such as mental deficiency, psychosis, epilepsy, senility, post-polio, Parkinson's disease, multiple sclerosis, and brain tumor, was cited.
Proposals periodically are made to reintroduce the topic. The medical profession has in general been unwilling to assume the responsibility. Yet whenever cases do occur in which without any authorization death has been brought about, seldom is any action taken, and if taken, seldom is it drastic. A New Hampshire physician injected air into one of his patients in the early 1950's, and his only punishment was temporary suspension of license. There was also a physician tried for murder in Liege in 1963 for complicity with the mother in destroying a Thalidomide baby, but was acquitted.
These cases, I think, testify to the ambivalence we have over the severe problem we face when we see extreme suffering and at the same time are bound by our morality to preserve life. Here is the point when Holmes' description to the doctor's task (to cure seldom, to relieve often, to comfort always) becomes most apt. Here it would seem that it is our privilege, and unquestionably our duty "to comfort always."
In the context with which I started, we as physicians are bound by our societal norms to discharge the contract we enter into with our patient, guided by the principle of the integrity of the individual human being which pervades our religious and our legal system, and by the responsibilities imposed upon us by the position of trust we derive from our own ethical standards. The reason, it seems, that there is no satisfactory answer to the dilemmas which occasionally face us is that there is no way to bear a trust and not to keep it.
